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Abstract
This paper presents a recursive secret sharing technique that dis-
tributes k − 1 secrets of length b each into n shares such that each share
is effectively of length n
k−1
· b and any k pieces suffice for reconstructing
all the k − 1 secrets. Since n
k−1
is near the optimal factor of n/k, and
can be chosen to be close to 1, the proposed technique is space efficient.
Furthermore, each share is information theoretically secure, i.e. it does
not depend on any unproven assumption of computational intractability.
Such a recursive technique has potential applications in secure and reliable
storage of information on the Web and in sensor networks.
1 Introduction
Conventional secret sharing schemes, although information theoretically secure,
are space inefficient. Thus k-out-of-n secret sharing techniques have a ”blow-
up” factor of n, i.e. sharing a secret of size b requires a total storage space of
size b · n.
In order to improve space efficiency, computational secret sharing techniques
have been developed [1, 2, 3, 4] in which a symmetric key is used to encrypt
the original secret and the key is split into shares using conventional methods
of secret sharing. The encrypted secret is divided into pieces to which redun-
dancy is added by the use of block error correction techniques [5, 6, 7]. This
leads to a n-fold increase in key size, pieces of which have to be stored with
every share of the encrypted secret, hence becoming a overhead. Moreover, this
reduction in storage is achieved by relaxing the security requirements, since the
computational security is weaker than information theoretic security [7].
Consequently, we ask whether it is possible to improve space efficiency of
secret sharing techniques while maintaining information theoretic security. This
question is answered, herein, in the affirmative by proposing a secret sharing
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scheme that encodes k−1 secrets in n shares compared to conventional methods
of encoding 1 secret in n shares, thus increasing space efficiency and maintaining
information theoretic security.
In an earlier paper [8], a 2-out-of-2 (k = 2 and n = 2) recursive scheme for
secret sharing was proposed. In this method, if k secrets are chosen such that
they double in size, then all of the smaller secrets can be recursively stored in
the shares of larger secrets, so that two shares of size 2m can encode 2m+1 − 1
bits of information. For example, if we are to share 3 secrets s1 = 1, s2 = 01,
and s3 = 1011, then the two shares for s1 would be Ds11 = 0 and Ds12 = 1;
where exclusive-OR operation is used for secret reconstruction. The shares of
s1 can be used to create two shares of s2 as follows: Ds21 = Ds110 = 00 and
Ds22 = 0Ds12 = 01. Here Ds110 denotes concatenation of share 1 of secret s1
with 0; and 0Ds12 denotes concatenation of 0 with share 2 of secret s1, and so
on. Similarly, we can recursively use the shares of s2 to create the shares of s3:
Ds31 = Ds2110 = 0010 and Ds32 = 10Ds22 = 1001. As a result, the final two
shares for all the three secrets are 0010 and 1001. These shares have recursively
encoded within themselves the shares of smaller secrets. Consequently, 8 bits of
shares have encoded 7 bits of secrets. This is in comparison with conventional
methods that would require 14 bits of shares. Note that the example presented
here is slightly modified to improve the security of the scheme as compared to
that presented in [8]. This idea of recursive secret sharing has been extended
to 2-out-of-n secret sharing in [9], requiring a n-fold increase in secret sizes at
each step.
The schemes presented in [8, 9] that build upon the requirement of n-fold
increase in secret sizes at each step, only reduce the conventional blow up factor
of n to n− 1.
In this paper we relax the requirement of n-fold increase in secret sizes at
each step and present a general recursive k-out-of-n scheme that increases the
efficiency of secret sharing to nearly 100% with no restrictions on increase in
secret sizes, while maintaining information theoretic security. A result of this
relaxation on secret sizes is that we are able to reduce the blow factor from
n to n
k−1 . In more precise terms, we present a scheme that can store up to
k − 1 secrets of size b each using n shares such that each share is effectively of
size ( n
k−1 ) · b. This is in comparison with conventional secret sharing schemes
that store just one secret of size b in n shares, requiring a total storage of size
n · (k − 1) · b for k − 1 secrets. Hence our scheme is near optimal with a blow
up factor of n
k−1 which can be chosen to be close to 1. Further the scheme
is information theoretically secure and does not depend on any computational
assumptions.
The proposed recursive secret sharing scheme has applications in distributed
online storage of information discussed in [5, 6]. However, Rabin [5] discarded
the possibility of using secret sharing schemes because of the n-fold increase
in storage space required by conventional implementations of secret sharing
techniques. Since our scheme provides a near optimal way to encode data into
small shares with no information leakage, it becomes an ideal candidate for use
in secure online data storage. Such secure data storage scheme is an example of
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implicit data security since the word implicit conveys the idea that there is no
explicit encryption of data and no encryption keys are used. Data is so divided
that each piece is implicitly secure in itself and only reveals information when
k or more of the pieces are brought together.
2 Space efficient secret sharing
Below, we define the terms used in this paper for a (k, n) secret sharing scheme,
where any k out of n shares suffice to reconstruct the secret. Since we are work-
ing with information theoretically secure schemes b denotes the size of secret/s
as well as the size of share.
Definition 1. Blow-up factor (secret sharing)
= total size of shares
total size of secret/s encoded by the shares
= number of shares × size of a share
total size of original secret/s
Definition 2. Blow-up factor (conventional secret sharing)
= number of shares × size of a share
total size of original secret/s
= n×b
b
= n
Definition 3. Space optimal secret sharing scheme: A secret sharing scheme
with a blow up factor of n
k
, where 2 ≤ k ≤ n. This is because for an space
optimal secret sharing scheme
number of shares × size of a share
total size of original secret/s
= n×b
k×b
= n
k
Definition 4. Space efficient secret sharing scheme: A secret sharing scheme
that approaches the optimal blow up factor of n
k
.
The proposed scheme recursively builds upon Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
Since it is known that Shamir’s scheme is information theoretically secure, the
proposed scheme is also similarly secure. However, Shamir’s scheme generates
n shares for every single secret, giving rise to a n-fold increase in storage space.
Whereas, we share k−1 secrets using n shares resulting in only n
k−1 -fold increase
in storage space, which is near optimal.
We first briefly review the scheme presented by Shamir [10]. Note that
Shamir only encoded one secret s in n shares as discussed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1(Shamir’s secret sharing scheme)
1. Choose a prime p, p > max(s, n), where s ∈ Zp is the secret.
2. Choose k − 1 random numbers a1, a2, ..., ak−1, uniformly and indepen-
dently, from the field Zp.
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3. Using ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ (k− 1) and secret s, generate polynomial p(x) of degree
k − 1,
p(x) = s+ a1x+ a2x
2 + ...+ ak−1x
k−1 (mod p).
4. Sample p(x) at n points Di = p(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that the shares are
given by (i,Di).
The reconstruction of the secret is performed by interpolating any k points
(shares) and evaluating s = p(0). Algorithm 1 is known to be information
theoretically secure due to the properties of interpolation, which says that k− 1
shares do not reveal any information.
Throughout the paper, we work in a finite field Zp, where p is a prime and
p ≥ max(smax, n), where smax = max(si),1 ≤ i ≤ (k − 1), and s1, s2, ...,
sk−1 are the secrets. The shares will be denoted as Dsi1, Dsi2, ...,Dsim at the
intermediate stages, where 2 ≤ m ≤ k− 2 and D1, D2, ..., Dn at the final stage.
(Note that, as in Shamir’s scheme, Dsim’s are the y-coordinates only, while the
respective x-coordinates m’s, are implicitly known to all players.)
The intuition for the proposed scheme is as follows: We randomly and uni-
formly choose a number a1 ∈ Zp and generate 1
st degree polynomial p1(x) =
a1x+ s1. Then we sample p1(x) at two points Ds11 = p1(1) and Ds12 = p1(2),
to generate two shares for s1. This first step can be viewed as a direct exe-
cution of Shamir’s (2, 2) secret sharing scheme. Next we use these two shares
of s1 to generate polynomial p2(x) = Ds12x
2 + Ds11x + s2, where the coeffi-
cients are the previous two shares and the free term is the new secret. Sampling
p2(x) at three points Ds21 = p2(1), Ds22 = p2(2), and Ds23 = p2(3), gener-
ates three shares of s2. We can now delete Ds11 and Ds11 because the new
shares Ds21, Ds22, and Ds23 have the shares of s1 hidden within themselves.
We then use the shares of s2 to create a 3
rd degree polynomial with s3 as its
free term and generate shares for s3 by sampling the newly created polyno-
mial at 4 points. These four points denoted as Ds31, Ds32, Ds33, and Ds34
have the shares of s1, s2 as well as s3 and therefore Ds21, Ds22 and Ds23 can
now be deleted. The process is repeated for secrets s4, s5, ..., sk−1 by cre-
ating p4(x), p5(x), ...,pk−2(x) and repetitive sampling and reusing of shares
and deleting the older shares. At the last step, we generate a polynomial
pk−1(x) = Dsk−2(k−1)x
k−1 +Dsk−2(k−2)x
k−2 + ...+Dsk−21x+ sk−1 and sample
it at n points D1 = pk−1(1), D2 = pk−1(2), ..., Dn = pk−1(n), such that the
final shares are given by (i,Di), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. These final n shares have recur-
sively hidden k−1 secrets within themselves. Algorithm 2 illustrates the process.
Algorithm 2 - Dealing Phase
1. Randomly and uniformly choose a number a1 ∈ Zp and generate polyno-
mial p1(x) = a1x+ s1.
2. Sample p1(x) at two points Ds11 = p1(1) and Ds12 = p1(2), which repre-
sent two shares of s1.
4
3. Do for 2 ≤ i ≤ (k − 1)
(a) Generate polynomial,
pi(x) = Dsi−1ix
i +Dsi−1(i−1)x
i−1 + ...+Dsi−11x+ si.
(b) Sample pi(x) to create new shares,
i. If i < k − 1, sample at i+ 1 points:
Dsi1 = pi(1)
Dsi2 = pi(2)
...
Dsi(i+1) = pi(i + 1).
ii. If i = k − 1, sample at n points:
D1 = pi(1)
D2 = pi(2)
...
Dn = pi(n).
(c) If i < k − 1, delete old shares: Dsi−11, Dsi−12, ..., Dsi−1i.
4. The final n shares are explicitly given by (i,Di), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For a the trivial case of just one secret s1 and a (2, n) secret sharing, the
algorithm stops at step 2, where we sample the polynomial of first degree p1(x)
at n-points to create n shares such that any 2 of the shares can reconstruct s1.
Algorithm 2 - Reconstruction Phase
1. Interpolate any k shares (i,Di) to generate the polynomial of degree k−1,
pk−1(x) = Dsk−2(k−1)x
k−1 +Dsk−2(k−2)x
k−2 + ...+Dsk−21x+ sk−1
and evaluate sk−1 = pk−1(0).
2. Do for all i = k − 2 down to 1
(a) Interpolate i+1 shares given by (m+1, Dsi(m+1)), 0 ≤ m ≤ i obtained
from coefficients of pi+1(x) to generate polynomial of degree i,
pi(x) = Dsi−1ix
i +Dsi−1(i−1)x
i−1 + ...+Dsi−11x+ si.
(b) Evaluate si = pi(0).
As seen above the reconstruction of secrets is straightforward. Any k of the
players can interpolate the polynomial of degree k − 1 such that the free term
represents sk−1 = pk−1(0). Then using the k − 1 coefficients of this polynomial
as points (leaving out the free term which is sk−1), interpolate the polynomial
of degree k − 2 to obtain sk−2. This process is repeated until we obtain s1.
Algorithm 2 has clearly been able to share k − 1 secrets among n players
such that every k of them can interpolate all the k − 1 secrets. Therefore, the
blow up factor has been reduced to n
k−1 .
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Theorem 1 Algorithm 2 generates information theoretically secure shares.
Proof The proof builds up on the security of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
We know that Shamir’s scheme is information theoretically secure. Note that
step 1-2 in Algorithm 2 may be viewed as (2, 2) Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
As a result, the shares for s1, i.e. Ds11 and Ds12 are information theoretically
secure. In other words, given any number r ∈ Zp, Pr(r = Ds11) = Pr(r =
Ds12) =
1
p
.
Moreover, since a1 is randomly and uniformly chosen from the field, Ds11
and Ds12 can be viewed as random numbers. These shares are then used as
random coefficients to generate a (3,3) Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, with
secret s2 as the free term. The shares of s2 from (3,3) Shamir’s scheme encode
the shares of s1 within themselves and can be used as coefficients to create a
(4,4) Shamir’s scheme with s3 as the free term. Now, the shares s3 from the
(4,4) Shamir’s scheme encode the shares of s1 and s2 in themselves. We then
use these new shares to generate a (5,5) Shamir’s with s4 as the free term and
so on. This process is repeated until we reach a (k − 1, k − 1) Shamir’s scheme
and have encoded k − 2 secrets.
At this point, we use the shares of sk−2 as coefficients to generate a (k−1)
th
degree polynomial pk−1(x) with sk−1 as the free term. We then sample pk−1(x)
at n-points, i.e. a (k, n) Shamir’s scheme. Note that these final n-points (shares)
encode the shares of k − 1 secrets within themselves.
Our algorithm is recursive and given that the (2,2) Shamir’s scheme is secure,
Algorithm 2 generates information theoretically secure shares. 
Example. Let s1 = 17, s2 = 28, s3 = 5, and s4 = 12 be four secrets that
are to be shared between 7 players such that any 5 of them can reconstruct all
the 4 secrets. Let prime p = 31.
Dealing phase.
1. Randomly and uniformly choose a number a1 ∈ Zp. Let a1 = 22. Generate
polynomial, p1(x) = a1x+ s1 = 22x+ 17 (mod 31).
2. Sample p1(x) at two points to generate two shares of secret s1, i.e. Ds11 =
p1(1) = 8 and Ds12 = p1(2) = 30.
3. Generate polynomial p2(x) = Ds12x
2 +Ds11x+ s2 = 30x
2 + 8x+ 28.
4. Sample p2(x) at 3 points to generate three shares of s2, i.e. Ds21 = p2(1) =
4, Ds22 = p2(2) = 9, and Ds23 = p2(3) = 12.
5. Delete Ds11 and Ds12.
6. Generate polynomial p3(x) = Ds23x
3 + Ds22x
2 + Ds21x + s3 = 12x
3 +
9x2 + 4x+ 5.
7. Sample p3(x) at 4 points to generate four shares of s3, i.e. Ds31 = p3(1) =
30, Ds32 = p3(2) = 21, Ds33 = p3(3) = 19, and Ds34 = p3(4) = 3.
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8. Delete Ds21, Ds22, and Ds23.
9. Generate polynomial
p4(x) = Ds34x
4 +Ds33x
3 +Ds32x
2 +Ds31x + s4 = 3x
4 + 19x3 + 21x2 +
30x+ 12.
10. Sample p4(x) at 7 points, which represents the final 7 shares. Hence,
D1 = p4(1) = 23, D2 = p4(2) = 15, D3 = p4(3) = 24, D4 = p4(4) = 3,
D5 = p4(5) = 8, D6 = p4(6) = 12, and D7 = p4(7) = 29.
11. Delete Ds31, Ds32, Ds33, and Ds34.
The final seven shares are given by (1, D1) = (1, 23); (2, D2) = (2, 15);
(3, D3) = (3, 24); (4, D4) = (4, 3); (5, D5) = (5, 8); (6, D6) = (6, 12); and
(7, D7) = (7, 29).
Reconstruction phase.
All the four secrets can be reconstructed using any 5 out of 7 final shares.
Using 5 shares, say (1, 23), (3, 24), (4, 3), (5, 8), and (7, 29), we can inter-
polate the 4th degree polynomial p4(x) = 3x
4 + 19x3 + 21x2 + 30x + 12 (mod
31), thus retrieving secret s4 (the free term of the polynomial) by evaluating
s4 = p4(0).
Then extracting the coefficients of p4(x) and using them as y-coordinates of
points x=1, 2, 3, and 4, i.e. (1, 30), (2, 21), (3, 19), and (4, 3) we can regenerate
the 3rd degree polynomial p3(x) = 12x
3 + 9x2 + 4x + 5 by interpolation and
retrieve the s3 as the free term, s3 = p3(0).
The coefficients of p3(x) are then used as points (1, 4), (2, 9), (3, 13) to
interpolate p2(x) = 30x
2 + 8x+ 28 and reconstruct s2 = p2(0).
The coefficients of p2(x) are used as (1, 8) and (2, 30) to interpolate p1(x) =
22x+ 17 and reconstruct s1 = p1(0).
The algorithm simulates a Last In First Out (LIFO) data structure.
3 Conclusions
We have presented a recursive scheme that distributes k − 1 secrets amongst n
individuals. The scheme is general and it places no restriction on the secret size.
Since this method builds upon Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, it is information
theoretically secure. It has a blow up factor of n
k−1 which is near the optimal
blow up factor of n
k
and represents a significant improvement over conventional
secret sharing schemes.
The proposed scheme has applications in secure distributed storage of infor-
mation on the Web and in sensor networks.
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